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Every citizen is entitled, as a matter of justice, to a fair share of free time. 
This is the core argument of Free Time. The argument rests on the widely 
held commitment to ensuring that citizens possess the means to exercise 
their freedoms, rooted in the recognition that if citizens lack the means to 
make effective use of their formally guaranteed freedoms, those freedoms 
are of little worth. A foundational tenet of liberal egalitarian theories of 
justice is, as such, what I term the effective freedoms principle: citizens 
have legitimate claims to a fair share of the resources generally required to 
exercise their formal liberties and opportunities.
Though the effective freedoms principle is applied most often to 
citizens’ requirements for material resources, it applies in the same way to 
the resource of free time: time that is not consumed by meeting the 
necessities of life, that one can devote to one’s own pursuits and 
commitments. This argument has been overlooked, yet it is readily 
apparent on reflection. Consider, for instance, how, in order to exercise 
one’s right to vote, one must have not only the means to get to the polls, but 
also the free time to do so. Citizens generally require free time to make 
effective use of the full range of their fundamental liberties, as well as any 
of their broader legal freedoms and opportunities. As such, I argue, on the 
basis of the effective freedoms principle, citizens have legitimate claims to 
the resource of free time. 
Though this argument has been absent from contemporary liberal 
theories of justice, it can be found in a recognizable form in the arguments 
of American nineteenth century labor reformers in their fight for time. For 
citizens to enjoy their rights to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,” 
insisted “The Working Men’s Declaration of Independence,” they must 
have the “means” to make use of them.1 “It is true”, they argued, “that 
churches are erected, school houses are built, mechanics’ institutes are 
founded and libraries ready to receive us … but alas! We lack the time to use 
them – time”.2 Workers required free time not only to make use of their 
fundamental political, associational, and religious liberties, but more 
1 “The Working Men’s Declaration of Independence”, December 1829 in Foner 
(1976: 49) original emphasis.
2 W. Sylvis (1968: 199) original emphasis; quoted in Roediger and Foner (1989: 99).
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broadly to pursue any of their own ends, as encapsulated in their demand 
for “eight hours for work, eight hours for rest, and eight hours for what we 
will”.3
Though ensuring that citizens enjoy the means to make use of their 
freedoms is a central liberal egalitarian commitment, contemporary 
liberal theories of justice have given little attention to “hours for what we 
will”. Instead, they have implicitly assumed that free time is not an 
appropriate or worthy concern of a liberal theory of justice. Given this 
incongruity, it is worth considering why. It owes, I argue, to two mistaken 
views. 
The standard liberal egalitarian approach to distributive justice, which 
I label liberal proceduralism, is to ensure a fair distribution of resources, 
the all-purpose means that are generally required to pursue any conception 
of the good, in order to ensure that citizens have fair access to various 
specific goods, or the particular components of one’s particular conception 
of the good. This approach – with which my argument has no quarrel – 
aims to secure the just background conditions within which citizens can 
pursue their own ideas of the good life. Importantly, on this standard 
approach, for the state to directly target the distribution of specific goods 
is presumptively inappropriate. Absent some exceptional justification, the 
proper aim is instead to ensure a just distribution of all-purpose means. 
The first mistake explaining the neglect of free time is that political 
philosophers have generally conceptualized it in terms that render it a 
specific good.4 Leisure has been variously understood as time engaged in 
intrinsically valuable activities, or as time in play and recreation, or – most 
common among theorists of distributive justice – as time not engaged in 
paid work, and on each understanding, as a specific good. (To keep this 
distinction clear, I use leisure to refer to the specific good and free time the 
resource). This limited view is, however, an error, for it overlooks the way, 
captured in the appeal for “hours for what we will”, that free time is itself 
an all-purpose means.
Free time – understood specifically as time not committed to meeting 
one’s own, or one’s dependents’, basic needs, which are the needs one must 
generally meet to attain a basic level of functioning in one’s society – is, I 
argue, properly regarded as a resource. It is a necessary input that is 
3 Rosenzweig (1983); see also Gourevitch (2015: 126–32, 144–45); Hunnicutt (2013: 
1–94).
4 Goodin et al.’s Discretionary Time is an important and notable exception (Goodin 
et al. 2008). My conception of free time, though it departs from their account, is indebted to 
their view of discretionary time as time not consumed by the necessities of life. For another 
account that draws on Goodin et al.'s conception, see Shippen (2014).
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generally required to pursue any conception of the good, and it meets the 
conditions to be an object of a public and feasible theory of justice.
The second mistake is the implicit assumption, stemming from the 
economic view of time and money as fungible goods, of what I call the 
time-money substitutability claim: that realizing a just distribution of 
income and wealth is sufficient to ensure a just distribution of free time. If 
this claim were true, it would not be necessary to give any distinct attention 
to free time as an object of justice. Yet, neither of the assumptions on which 
the claim depends – the perfect divisibility of labor demand and the perfect 
substitutability of money and basic needs satisfaction – can be sustained. 
Given both ethical and empirical limitations of economic markets, 
individuals cannot always unobjectionably purchase the satisfaction of 
their own, or their dependents’, basic needs, nor can they always freely 
choose to reduce their hours of paid work to the level they prefer (even for 
a corresponding reduction in pay, a phenomenon economists term 
overemployment).
With these obstacles cleared, it is then possible to construct the core 
argument for citizens’ claims to free time. First, free time is itself a resource. 
Second, if a theory of justice endorses the effective freedoms principle, as all 
liberal egalitarian theories do, then citizens have legitimate claims, as a matter 
of justice, to fair shares of free time. Further, to ensure that citizens have their 
fair shares, free time must be treated as a distinct object of justice. 
Ensuring that citizens have their fair shares of free time requires, if 
everyone’s fair share is, say, eight hours per day, ensuring that all citizens are 
able to meet their basic needs in sixteen hours per day (e.g. with income 
subsidies or in-kind provisions), as well as protecting citizens’ ability to choose 
to spend no more than this time meeting their basic needs (e.g. with work 
hours regulations). Moreover, citizens must not only have the requisite 
amount of free time, they must enjoy it on conditions that allow them to 
effectively use it to exercise their liberties, which include having access to 
generally usable periods of free time on predictable schedules.  
With the central argument in place, I turn then to developing some of its 
implications in the later chapters. Chapter 5 argues that, because citizens’ 
exercise of their freedom of association, whether civic, religious, or social, 
generally requires sharing time together, citizens require access to free time 
shared with a significant portion of those with whom one currently associates 
and might associate. Access to shared free time may be realized by providing 
citizens with vast amounts of free time, greater work schedule flexibility, or a 
common period of free time. If the first is not an option, I argue that instituting 
a common period of free time across society – realized, for instance, with 
Sunday closing laws (in a modified form consistent with economic and 
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religious liberty) – may be the best means of ensuring effective freedom of 
association in a pluralistic democratic society.
Chapter 6 turns to the question of whether parents and other caregivers 
are entitled to workplace accommodations that enable them to combine paid 
work, caregiving, and free time, such as paid leave and short and flexible 
hours schedules. I argue that they are, if citizens’ claims to free time are 
developed such that: citizens have pro tanto claims to free time in their chosen 
occupations; and basic caregiving for children, like other dependents, is 
treated as a necessary activity that (to a point) deducts from free time. Taking 
on these terms, I argue that they yield a presumptive claim to be able to engage 
in paid work, basic caregiving, or the combination, while also having free time.
One final point to make is that the core argument – that citizens are entitled 
to a fair share of free time – holds on any theory that endorses the effective 
freedoms principle, as all liberal egalitarian theories do. Across this broad 
range of theories, the principle is recognized and developed in different ways. 
So that the core argument applies broadly, it is constructed to not depend on 
taking particular positions on a set of contested issues across these theories. 
The later chapters do take positions on some of these issues (most notably 
related to individual responsibility) in order to draw out some of the argument’s 
implications, but one might adopt different positions and develop the core 
argument in other ways, yielding another set of implications. Indeed, once the 
core claim is recognized, citizens’ claim to the resource of free time ought to 
be incorporated into theories of justice in a diverse and expansive array of 
ways. 
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